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The Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entre-
preneurship Act of 2015 (SPACE Act)1 aims to promote wealth
creation by guaranteeing protection of U.S. citizens’ property
rights to celestial resources. But there are serious concerns that
government protection of space property claims are incompati-
ble with international law. This article proposes a purely private
legal system for space commerce as an alternative to govern-
ment-defined and enforced property rights. Economic theory
shows how property rights and rules for adjudicating disputes
can be self-enforcing. Economic history shows that such a system
has worked well for centuries in international trade. A private
legal commercial order for space is thus both feasible and
desirable.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE SPACE ACT was signed into law by President Obama onNovember 25, 2015. Since then, several provisions of the act
have been the subject of controversy in policy and scholarly cir-
cles. Of particular importance is 51 U.S.C. § 51302, which in-
structs the executive branch to “promote the right of U.S.
citizens to engage in commercial exploration for and commer-
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College of Business at Texas Tech University. He is also the Comparative
Economics Research Fellow at TTU’s Free Market Institute. Dr. Salter received
his Ph.D. from George Mason University in 2014. His research on space-related
topics focuses on legal issues with property rights to celestial resources, as well as
economics of space law more generally. The author thanks Gil Guillory, Peter
Leeson, and Edward Stringham for helpful insights, and James Dean and Glenn
Furton for able research assistance. Any remaining errors belong to the author.
1 Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, Pub.
L. No. 114-19, 129 Stat. 704 (2015) [hereinafter SPACE Act].
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cial recovery of space resources free from harmful interference,
in accordance with the international obligations of the United
States and subject to authorization and continuing supervision
by the Federal Government.”2 While the text appears to guaran-
tee private property rights to celestial resources, it is unclear to
what extent this guarantee is compatible with the international
obligations of the United States, indicated in Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty.3
Under international law, states are sovereign and may define
and enforce property rights within their territories. In outer
space, the situation is different. No state may extend its sover-
eignty to outer space, as enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty,
which has been signed by the United States and all other
spacefaring nations. Article II of this treaty reads, “Outer space,
including the moon and celestial bodies, is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”4 This may also prevent pri-
vate citizens from appealing to their governments to defend
property rights to celestial resources5 As White6 points out, “in
common law countries such as the United States, legal theory
dictates that the government must have sovereignty over terri-
tory before it can confer title on its citizens. Consequently, tradi-
tional real property rights [in outer space] are inconsistent with
this theory.”
More recently, Tronchetti7 echoed White’s8 concerns:
The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act appears to
collide with numerous provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Par-
2 51 U.S.C. § 51302 (a)(3).
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2.
5 Virgiliu Pop, Approriation in Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land Owner-
ship and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POLICY 275, 280–81 (2000);
James E. Dustan, Towards a Unified Theory of Space Property Rights: Sometimes the Best
Way to Predict the Weather is to Look Outside, in SPACE: THE FREE MARKET FRONTIER
223, 223–41 (Edward L. Hudgins ed., 2002); Wayne White, The Legal Regime for
Private Activities in Outer Space, in SPACE: THE FREE MARKET FRONTIER 83, 83–111
(E.L. Hudgins ed., 2002); Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property
Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 139–42
(2009).
6 See White, The Legal Regime, supra note 5, at 84.
7 Fabio Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A Move For-
ward or a Step Back?, 34 SPACE POL’Y 6, 9 (2015).
8 White, The Legal Regime, supra note 5, at 96–97.
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ticularly problematic is its relation with Article II of the Treaty.
Under the Act the United States attributes itself the right to con-
fer property rights over space resources to its private companies.
Importantly, under international law, property rights require a
superior authority, a State, entitled to attribute and enforce
them. This signifies that States need to have property rights first
before being allowed to attribute them to other entities. Seeing
from this perspective the Act could be interpreted as an attempt
by the United States to claim property rights over asteroid re-
sources, a position which would clash with the non-appropriation
clause, not lastly because, as described, there is no consensus on
whether these resources can be appropriated and exploited.
Thus, there is serious question whether the U.S. government’s
understandable desire to create an environment conducive to
flourishing space commerce—something for which a means of
defining and enforcing private property rights is essential9—is
in fact compatible with existing international law, to which the
United States has consented. Recognizing the dilemma,
Tronchetti10 points to two categories of solutions for this prob-
lem. One relies on governance mechanisms at the international
level and the other at the national level. Ultimately, Tronchetti11
seems to prefer a mixture of both:
If the objective of the United States is to support a private aster-
oid mining industry this viewpoint would suggest the United
States to follow an international and domestic path. Internation-
ally, the United States should take the initiative to try to achieve
recognition of the permissibility under existing space law of the
appropriation and utilization of celestial bodies [sic] resources
for purposes other than scientific. Until such a recognition exists
any national initiative addressing this issue would be challenged
and criticized. Domestically, the United States should support
the nascent private space mining sector. However, rather than
rushing the adoption of controversial legislation dealing with ex-
traterrestrial property rights, it should gradually develop a na-
tional regulatory framework to manage (non-governmental)
activities on celestial bodies, including the identification of com-
petent federal agencies, the establishment of technical and safety
standards as well as of licensing procedures.
9 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 504 (1776); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECO-
NOMICS (1949); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Para-
digm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 22–25 (1973); Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 97, 97–98 (1991).
10 Tronchetti, supra note 7, at 7–8.
11 Id. at 9.
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Pursuing international and domestic solutions through estab-
lished legal channels is certainly a worthy endeavor. However,
there is a third option not considered by Tronchetti, and consid-
ered little by those exploring the architecture for a future space
legal system. The two options, international and domestic, are
both public law options. There remains the possibility of com-
mercial space governance evolving along the lines of private law.
A private legal order for space commerce would not use existing
national or international institutions of public governance (law
creation, adjudication, enforcement, etc.). Instead, law would
result from specific bargains made among commercial entities,
including whatever dispute resolution procedures agreed to by
the parties themselves.
This article contributes to the literature on legal issues associ-
ated with property rights in space12 by exploring the implica-
12 See Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 349, 349 (1968); Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space,
SPACE FUTURE (1998), http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_ prop-
erty_rights_in_outer_space.shtml [https://perma.cc/3CCY-75CC]; Wayne N.
White, Jr., Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, PROC. FORTY-SECOND COL-
LOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE 174, 179–80 (2003); Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling Interna-
tional Space Law with the Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 194, 237 (2000); Lawrence A. Cooper, Encouraging Space Explora-
tion Through a New Application of Space Property Rights, 19 SPACE POLICY 111, 117
(2003); Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at
Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims, 1 REGENT J. INT’L L.
75, 94 (2003); Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of
Mankind Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property, 69 J. AIR L. &
COM. 689, 705–07 (2004); Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for Interna-
tional Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the
1967 Space Treaty for the Colonozation of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35
SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 355–57 (2004); Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der
Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sover-
eignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 98–99 (2005); Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal
System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 44 (2005);
Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International Authority
to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 489, 518 (2006);
Nikhil D. Cooper, Note, Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and Development of
United States Space Commerce, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 457, 482 (2009); Alan
Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law:
Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR L.
& COM. 37, 78 (2008); Tony Milligan, Property Rights and the Duty to Extend Human
Life, 27 SPACE POL’Y 190, 193 (2011); Rand Simberg, Homesteading the Final Fron-
tier: A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INST. 1 (2012), http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Rand%20Simberg%20-%20
Homesteading%20the%20Final%20Frontier.pdf; Rand Simberg, Property Rights in
Space, THE NEW ATLANTIS (2012); Brian C. Weeden & Tiffany Chow, Taking a
Common-Pool Resources Approach to Space Sustainability: A Framework and Potential Pol-
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tions of a private legal order for celestial commerce. Similar to
Salter and Leeson,13 this article explores the feasibility of a wide-
spread private legal order for commercial space activities, as well
as the socially beneficial aspects of this kind of ordering. This
argues that a private legal order permits the sophistication and
adaptability required to meet the inevitable wide range of partic-
ular circumstances facing commercial entities, while also provid-
ing the assurance necessary for commercial entities to form
expectations of each other’s future behavior. Since the article
discusses legal order not enforced by the state, it is also a part of
the literature on “analytic anarchism,”14 or how individuals and
social groups are able to govern themselves when they do not
have an irresistible monopoly enforcer. Systems of private law
lack this enforcer and so must devise order by other means.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section
II explores the feasibility of a private commercial legal order in
space. Section III considers the socially desirable aspects of such
a legal order. Section IV concludes by addressing several possi-
ble objections.
icies, 28 SPACE POL’Y 166, 172 (2012); Matthew Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier:
Keeping Earth’s Asteroid Mining Ventures from Becoming the Next Gold Rush, 14 PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 202, 234–35 (2014); Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western
Frontier: Applying Principles of the General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentive Asteroid
Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 168–69 (2013); Thomas R. Irwin, Note, Space
Rocks: A Proposal to Govern the Development of Outer Space and Its Resources, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 217, 245–46 (2015); Andrew Lintner, Extraterrestrial Extraction: The Interna-
tional Implications of the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, 40
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 139, 153–54 (2016); Alexander William Salter, Space Deb-
ris: A Law and Economics Analaysis of the Orbital Commons, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
221, 237–38 (2016).
13 See Alexander W. Salter & Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer
Space Commerce?, 34 CATO J. 581, 592–93 (2014).
14 See, e.g., DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL
CAPITALISM xii–xv (3d ed. 2014); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1–11 (1991); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J.
HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 4–5
(2004); Bryan Caplan & Edward P. Stringham, Privatizing the Adjudication of Dis-
putes, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 504, 599 (2008); Benjamin W. Powell & Ed-
ward P. Stringham, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey, 140
PUB. CHOICE 3–4 (2009); Peter Boettke, Anarchism and Austrian Economics, 7 NEW
PERSEPCTIVES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (2011); Edward P. Stringham & Todd J.
Zywicki, Hayekian Anarchism, 78 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 290, 293 (2011); PETER T.
LEESON, ANARCHY UNBOUND: WHY SELF-GOVERNANCE WORKS BETTER THAN YOU
THINK 1-3, 10 (2014); EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING OR-
DER IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE (2015).
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II. SELF-ENFORCING EXCHANGE: THE FEASIBILITY OF
PRIVATE LAW15
A. THEORY
Many economists and legal theorists believe that widespread
social order, including protection of private property, requires a
strong state to enforce contracts and uphold the rule of law.
While social scientists concede that in some small-scale settings
private ordering is viable, a large and robust commercial net-
work requires some element of public ordering. Today, this role
is filled by the state, which can reasonably be modeled as an
irresistible monopoly enforcer. This explains why many writers
on space commerce assume there must be some form of public
ordering—either national or international—that creates and
enforces property rights to celestial resources. The conventional
wisdom is admirably summarized by Pop: “Appropriation of
land can exist outside the sphere of sovereignty, but its survival
is dependent upon endorsement from a sovereign entity.”16
The standard model employed by social scientists when con-
sidering how individuals act without recourse to a sovereign en-
forcer is the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Two individuals, Alice and
Bob, are considering whether to acknowledge each other’s pri-
vate property rights. Each has two choices: respect the property
claims of the other (cooperate) or prey on the other and take
the other’s property (defect). Assume that Alice and Bob make
their choices simultaneously. If they both choose to cooperate,
they each receive a payoff of A > 0, gained from the enjoyment
of their property. However, if Alice defects while Bob cooper-
ates, Alice can receive a higher payoff C > A, while Bob is left
with B < 0. If both choose to defect, they engage in mutually
costly conflict and are left with a payoff of 0 each. This situation
is represented in the game matrix labeled Figure 1 below.
15 This section is adapted from Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, and is a
condensation of the argument contained therein.
16 Pop, supra note 5, at 281.
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Figure 1—The Prisoners’ Dilemma17
Without a sovereign to uphold Alice’s and Bob’s property
claims, they will both choose to defect. While they could both
earn a higher payoff if they cooperated, each player maximizes
his or her payoff by choosing to defect, regardless of what the
other player does. In other words, defecting is a dominant strat-
egy. We appear to be stuck in the Hobbesian jungle.
However, the above is limited in one important respect: it as-
sumes a one-time interaction between Alice and Bob. This is not
very realistic. When describing the behavior of potential eco-
nomic partners, it makes much more sense to assume they will
interact multiple times over their lives. If we assume Alice and
Bob will face this choice not just once, but indefinitely into the
future as well, the situation looks quite different. Suppose that
Alice and Bob are each willing to give the other a chance to
cooperate, but if either encounters defection, they will refuse to
cooperate (defect) for all subsequent interactions. Further as-
sume that each player discounts future payoffs by a factor of b,
which is between 0 and 1, since future payoffs are worth less
than that same payoff today, all else being equal. The closer b is
to 1, the less a player discounts future payoffs, implying a greater
degree of ‘patience.’ Now, the payoff for cooperation is
Figure 2
The payoff to each player for defecting is still C. But if they
choose to do this, they will receive a payoff of 0 in all future
17 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 585.
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periods. Using the rule for solving an infinite geometric series
and then solving for b, cooperation becomes the preferred strat-
egy for both Alice and Bob so long as
Figure 3
In other words, so long as Alice and Bob are sufficiently pa-
tient—they do not discount future payoffs too steeply—then a
cooperative solution is possible, even without a sovereign en-
forcer. Mutual respect of property rights becomes self-enforc-
ing. Social scientists call this the discipline of continuous dealings:
since the gains from defection are gained only once, but the
gains from cooperating extend into the indefinite future, ra-
tional individuals will be much more likely to cooperate when
they repeatedly interact.18 When applied to property rights in
the context of space commerce, we have good reason to suspect
that the relevant parties will be patient. Engaging in space com-
merce requires large up-front investments before commercial
entities will begin to see positive cash flow. Because of these
large fixed costs, space commerce as an industry will select for
those who are relatively patient, and are thus much more likely
to engage in cooperative ventures, including respecting the
property claims of other commercial entities.
The discipline of continuous dealings shows that, even with-
out an irresistible monopoly enforcer, property rights can exist
and be sustained. This is the foundation of a private commercial
legal order, but it is not a private commercial legal order itself.
More than theory is needed to demonstrate that purely private
law is viable. Fortunately, history supplies us with several such
examples, in such varied situations as medieval Iceland19 and
the 19th century American frontier.20 Probably most relevant to
the problem of private legal ordering for space commerce is in-
18 The above example had only two parties, Alice and Bob, but the logic holds
if there are more than two parties. In fact, as we add additional players, the possi-
bility of reputational effects strengthens the tendency for cooperation. If Alice
wishes to defect in her dealings with Bob, she not only has to worry about losing
future payoffs from cooperating with Bob, but she runs the risk of Bob telling
Charlie about Alice’s antisocial behavior. Thus, Alice loses two future trading
partners instead of just one.
19 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at xii–xv.
20 See ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 14, at 9.
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ternational trade and the institutions that provide the legal
framework that governs it.
B. HISTORY
Internationally, there is no sovereign. The world’s polities ex-
ist in a “state of nature.” Thus, there is no formal organization
that can define and enforce property rights among individuals
from different states who engage in commerce. “In this sense
the property rights situation that parties to international com-
merce confront is similar to the property rights situation that
prospective parties to outer space commerce confront.”21 If con-
ventional wisdom regarding the infeasibility of widespread se-
cure private property rights is accurate, then international
anarchy should render commerce between subjects of different
states extremely difficult and highly uncertain. Instead, we ob-
serve international commercial activity as rich, varied, and lucra-
tive. Parties to international commercial deals have access to a
sophisticated private and voluntary legal system that helps them
adjudicate disputes and accurately form expectations of future
behavior such that the need for dispute resolution in the first
place is low. It would be inaccurate to describe international
commerce as an Eden of laissez-faire, but it is far more orderly
than the conventional wisdom would suggest.
The reasons for this are complex and have deep historical
roots. It is well known that, following the collapse of the Roman
Empire in the West, the volume of international trade shrank
considerably.22 The legal infrastructure provided by the Empire
no longer stood, and the transition away from this order caused
significant commercial disruption. By the ninth and tenth cen-
turies, trade was recovering.23 Across Europe, a professional
merchant class emerged and developed mechanisms to resolve
disputes over property rights and contract enforcement, even
when subjects were from different polities and thus no national
court had jurisdiction.24
The solution was private, merchant-developed law that was en-
forced in private, merchant-developed courts. This medieval law
merchant (lex mercatoria) was a system of self-enforcing property
21 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 588.
22 See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 3 SOUTH-
ERN ECON. J. 645, 646 (1989).
23 See id.
24 See id. at 646–47.
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rights according to legal rules that emerged out of dispute reso-
lution among interested parties.25 On this basis, international
commerce and commercial law “have developed coterminously,
without the aid . . . of the coercive power of nation-states . . . .”26
The content of these rules initially owed much to the newly-
rediscovered Roman civil law. But the rules evolved as best com-
mercial practices in specific geographic locales became recog-
nized and incorporated into the lex mercatoris, such that they
informed and became a part of standard merchant practice for
those engaged in international trade.27
As for the courts, they developed their own rules of evidence
and protocols for consulting experts, whose services were fre-
quently needed when dealing with the highly specialized issues
that pertained to international commercial contracts. Benson28
and Milgrom et al.29 note that these courts often operated with
significantly less pomp and circumstance than the national
courts of the time and reached decisions much more quickly,
which was a feature highly valued by international traders. As for
enforcing a merchant court’s decision, international traders re-
lied on reputational effects in the context of the discipline of
continuous dealings, as described earlier.30 The courts them-
selves had no formal enforcement power. They could not coer-
cively compel compliance with a decision.31 But most traders
complied with merchant court decisions, even without the
threat of coercive enforcement. Failure to do so would quickly
brand one as a defector, and thus unsafe as a trading partner.32
This would make it extraordinarily difficult to find willing trad-
ing partners, and hence to continue to make profits, in the fu-
ture. Thus, the vast majority of decisions regarding contract
dispute were self-enforcing.
Today, international trade is still overwhelmingly privately
governed. Although modern states have much higher capacity
to create and enforce property rights than medieval polities,
those engaged in international trade choose to make use of pri-
25 Id. at 647.
26 Id. at 645.
27 Id. at 648.
28 Id. at 649–51.
29 See Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECONOMICS & POLITICS 1,
5–6 (1990).
30 See id. at 7–14.
31 See Benson, supra note 22, at 650.
32 See Milgrom et al., supra note 29, at 9–10.
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vate arbitration.33 At least ninety percent of international com-
merce contracts contain clauses that state parties will, in the
event of dispute, pursue private arbitration.34 In 2001, the larg-
est provider of private arbitration services, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), was involved in disputes between
over 1,500 parties from 115 countries. These disputes ranged
from $50 to $1 billion, with over sixty percent for amounts be-
tween $1 million and $1 billion.35 In the same year, the Interna-
tional Center for Dispute Resolution, another private arbitration
organization, was involved in disputes totaling $10 billion with
parties from sixty-three countries.36 As in medieval times, deci-
sions reached by private arbitration are almost always respected
by the commercial parties. The ICC estimates that ninety per-
cent of its decisions are complied with voluntarily,37 due to the
discipline of continuous dealings and reputational effects.38
Theory and history thus show that creation and enforcement
of private property rights, along with a body of law that provides
for dispute adjudication, can exist even without sovereign over-
sight. There is no prima facie reason to think that “celestial an-
archy,” an environment free from the jurisdiction of national
sovereigns due to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, will be
any different than international anarchy on earth. But this
merely demonstrates that widespread private ordering for space
commerce is viable. It remains to be seen whether such a system
is desirable. The next section considers this latter criterion.
33 Peter T. Leeson, How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?, 10 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 61, 62 (2008).
34 Id. at 64.
35 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 590 (citing 2001 Statistical Report, 13(1)
ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 5, 6, 8 (2002)).
36 See Salter & Leeson, supra 13, at 593.
37 Leeson, How Important is State Enforcement, supra note 33, at 68.
38 Since 1958, sovereigns have had a partial role in enforcing international
trade contracts. In that year, the first multinational treaty was signed to facilitate
the enforcement of private arbitration decisions in national courts. Signatory na-
tions to the United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention, or NYC) agree
that, if a citizen loses an arbitration judgment to a foreign national, the foreign
national can have this decision coercively enforced by the citizen’s government.
However, this does not invalidate the self-enforcing nature of international com-
merce for two reasons. First, international commerce was substantial prior to
1958. Even if the treaty helped, it was by no means necessary. Second, the treaty is
still an agreement among sovereigns who are in a state of nature with respect to
each other. International anarchy still prevails, since there is no international
sovereign who can compel agreement and compliance. See Leeson, How Important
is State Enforcement, supra note 33, at 83.
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III. ORGANIZATIONS AND ORDERS: THE DESIRABILITY
OF PRIVATE LAW
A. KINDS OF SOCIAL ORDER
Desirability is an inherently normative concept, dealing in
statements not just of “is,” but also of “ought.” To keep the anal-
ysis as broad as possible, when the author argues that a private
legal order for celestial commerce is desirable, he means that it
possesses general features conducive to the satisfaction of
human wants that are near-unanimously judged to be socially
beneficial. These features are the combination of stability and
adaptability: a legal system ought to provide firm ground upon
which parties can form reliable expectations of future behavior
but must also be sensitive to particulars and changeable when
circumstances require.
As a body of rules for coordinating social behavior, a legal
system must possess mechanisms that align the incentives of those
who act within it and provide them the information necessary to
achieve their goals in a way compatible with the similar desire of
others. To understand how this is possible, we need to distin-
guish between two kinds of order, regularity or coordination, in
the social world.39 The most salient kind of order is consciously
brought into being.40 This kind of order is purposively created
by a mind or group of minds.41 An example would be a business
firm or an administrative bureaucracy. These types of social bod-
ies, or organizations, can be reasonably characterized as having a
goal or teleology.42 However, purposely created order is not the
only kind of order in the social world. There is also emergent or
spontaneous order; to paraphrase Adam Ferguson, “the result of
human action, but not the execution of any human design.”43
These orders are not intentionally created by any one mind or
group of minds.44 As social systems, they frequently have tenden-
cies or characteristics, but they are not goal-oriented.45 Hayek
calls this kind of system an “order,” or (felicitously, given this
39 See 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35–54
(1973).
40 See id. at 36.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 37.
43 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society 1, 205 (1767), http://
oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ferguson-an-essay-on-the-history-of-civil-society [https:/
/perma.cc/5PFK-M6WS].
44 See HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 36–37.
45 Id. at 38.
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article’s subject) a cosmos.46 An order is created by interactions
among various organizations.47 The properties of the order can
be explained with reference to the characteristics of the organi-
zations that interact within it, but these properties are not re-
ducible to the various constituent organizations.48 The whole is
more than the sum of its parts; or, more accurately, the whole
has properties that are exhibited by none of the parts in
particular.49
The organization-order distinction has been most extensively
developed in the theory of markets. Markets are comprised of
organizations (households, firms) but the market itself is an or-
der. Hayek50 explored the properties of markets as orders, not-
ing that in markets, millions of individuals are somehow able to
coordinate their actions and cooperate with each other, in their
capacities as consumers or producers, despite not knowing each
other personally, and despite knowing only an infinitesimal
amount of the total knowledge embedded within markets. Mar-
kets are able to achieve a tremendous degree of coordination
due to the system of prices that continually adjust in response to
changing supply and demand conditions.51 Market prices ex-
press tradeoffs, in the form of real resource scarcities across vari-
ous alternative lines of production. When acting in markets,
households’ and firms’ subjective valuations of goods and ser-
vices confront objective tradeoffs.52 When supply and demand
conditions change, prices change, which provide a crutch for
households and firms in coordinating their production and con-
sumption decisions.
As an example, if an unexpected frost kills a portion of an
orange crop, fewer oranges will be available for exchange on the
market. In the interests of efficiency (directing resources to
their highest-valued uses), the marginal orange should be saved
for only the most valuable, feasible lines of production or con-
sumption, which have been reduced due to the frost. Markets
provide the information and incentives necessary for precisely
this to happen: the reduced supply of oranges will cause the
price of oranges to rise; households that consume oranges, and
46 Id.
47 Id. at 37.
48 Id. at 36.
49 Id. at 42.
50 See F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 33–56 (1948).
51 See id. at 41–42.
52 See id. at 44–45.
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firms that purchase oranges to make orange juice, etc. will scale
back their purchase of oranges. This leaves more of the smaller
total quantity of oranges for purchase by those who are willing
to pay the higher price. But, those who are willing to pay the
higher price are those who value the oranges more highly in
consumption, or are those who believe they can use the oranges
as inputs into producing other goods, such as Grand Marnier,
which are more valuable to consumers, and thus justify paying
the higher price. No household or firm needs to know specifics
about the frost nor exactly how the price effects of the frost will
spill over into various markets. Markets help generate this
knowledge due to the mutual adjustments between suppliers
and demanders and provide each an incentive to steward the
scarce resource in the form of a cost (the price) that must be
incurred in order to acquire the resource.53
Thus, the tendency towards efficiency, and thus the mutual co-
ordination of consumers’ and producers’ plans, is a property
not of any household or firm, or group of households or firms,
but the market itself.54 This also suggests why command and
control solutions to economic problems, such as complete so-
cialism, fail. Command and control for an entire market econ-
omy destroys the social intelligence of the marketplace by
replacing it with the much, much more limited intelligence of
the organization in charge of allocating resources. The knowl-
edge necessary to put resources to their highest-valued uses does
not exist in a manner that can be harnessed by any person or
group. The market, in order to deliver the benefits we have
come to expect from commercial exchange, must be an order.
The above summary of the core insight of market theory illus-
trates the importance of orders in promoting social coordina-
tion. Many things are far too complex to be trusted to
consciously crafted organizations. Within the field of law and
economics, many scholars have noted that legal systems, as
sources of social rule creation and enforcement, also fit the or-
ganization-order typology. An example of organization-created
rules would be bureaucratic fiat, whereas an example of order-
created rules would be judicial decisions in a common law sys-
tem. Posner55 famously argued that the common law system had
53 See id. at 50–55.
54 Id.
55 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249–75 (Vicki Been et
al. eds., 7th ed. 2007).
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strong tendencies to produce efficient legal rules and linked this
tendency to features of the system such as judge-made law, ad-
versarial proceedings, and precedent. For our purposes, what
matters is the emphasis Posner and other scholars placed on the
adjustment mechanisms in legal systems that helped coordinate
the behavior of those who acted within these systems.
B. ORDER AND PRIVATE LAW
In a competitive, discovery-oriented legal system, rules are
analogous to market prices.56 Market prices give parties informa-
tion regarding the terms of exchange; legal rules give to parties
the terms of interaction, providing a “language” of interpersonal
conduct.57 Like market prices, legal rules that coordinate the
actions of those governed by these rules must be discovered,
rather than set in advance.58 A private legal ordering of the kind
discussed in Section II is one in which rules that do a good job
of providing both stability and flexibility are likely to be discov-
ered and maintained, while rules that do a poor job are likely to
be discarded. The medieval and modern law merchant are legal
orders that are private. Its rules emerge from the decentralized
interaction of traders and arbitrators, rather than from any cen-
tralized apparatus of command.59 Admittedly, it is not the only
kind of legal order possible. The common law is also an order,
as the writings of Hayek and Posner show.60 Furthermore, the
role of public courts in common law systems show that a legal
order need not be wholly private. But, such a legal order can be
purely private, as the law merchant demonstrates.
What are the systemic properties of private commercial law
that produce social coordination, by aligning the incentives and
information of those engaged in commerce? There are several
institutional features that, in tandem, achieve this.61 First, the
56 See Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 590 (2008).
57 See id. at 591.
58 See id. at 594–96.
59 Id. at 597.
60 See id. at 602–03.
61 See Benson, supra note 22, 660–61; Bryan Caplan & Edward P. Stringham,
Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 503, 528
(2008); FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at xii–xv; David Friedman, Private Creation and
Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410–11 (1979); Carrie
B. Kerekes & Claudia R. Williamson, Discovering Law: Hayekian Competition in Medi-
eval Iceland, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 432, 445 (2012); Edward Stringham, Market Cho-
sen Law, 14 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 53, 76–77 (1999); Edward P. Stringham,
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foundational principles of private commercial law, which will
likely be applicable to nascent space commerce as well, are well
established through centuries-long usage. Importantly, this does
not preclude innovations at the margin, as particular circum-
stances arise that extend the application of the basic legal princi-
ples to new particulars, without erasing the principles
themselves:
[T]he primary principles underlying customary business law are
[unlikely] to change. The basic rules of private property and
freedom of contract developed centuries ago . . . the need for
extensions of these basic principles to cover unanticipated cir-
cumstances always arises, however, and customary law adapts,
building on the existing base of substantive principles.62
These foundational principles are the basic material commer-
cial traders use to form expectations about what rules will be
respected in engaging with fellow trading partners, what actions
cause parties to seek adjudication, and how those adjudications
are likely to be resolved. Importantly, the customary body of
merchant law is not codified law, in the sense of a centrally com-
piled set of rules that detail how particular disputes have been
or will be resolved.63 Rather, the law took the form of
written commercial instruments and contracts. In this regard, note
that ‘contract law’ refers to the ‘law’ that parties in exchange bring into
existence by their contractual agreement rather than to the law of or about
contracts. . . . As contractual form came into common usage it
actually became a part of the Law Merchant.64
While the foundational principles are unchanging, their par-
ticular applications frequently do change to meet the needs of
commerce. The principles provide stability, but contractual in-
novations that arise as the needs of trade dictate, and are en-
forced in private commercial courts, provide flexibility.65
Furthermore, these contractual innovations, provided they per-
sistently help traders meet their goals, become generally used in
the course of commerce, and thus become law.66 As Benson
notes:
Extending the Analysis of Spontaneous Market Order to Governance, 42 ATLANTIC ECON.
J. 171, 178 (2014); STRINGHAM, supra note 14, at 4–5.
62 Benson, supra note 22, at 659 (footnotes omitted).
63 See id. at 649.
64 Id. at 649 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
65 See id. at 649–51.
66 See id. at 651–54.
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[i]f a contract is a standard one based on long standing tradition,
it simply reflects existing customary commercial law; if a contract
develops an effective new business practice in the face of a new
situation, it is likely to add to customary law. Since commerce
operates in a dynamic continually changing environment, new
contractual arrangements are always being mediated—new law is
being created.67
This combination of stability and flexibility is what provides
traders and arbitrators the information they need to coordinate
their behavior. The foundational customary principles, which
are widely publicly known, give adjudicators information on how
to deal with basic disputes; traders know this, and take actions to
avoid basic disputes, since disputes are costly to all parties.68 Par-
ticular extensions can be less well known, since in modern com-
mercial arbitration the proceedings and awards of damages are
almost always kept private. However, traders and arbitrators in-
teract within a social network that fosters the transmission of in-
formation. For example, arbitrators may discuss cases by
anonymizing key details. And while there are no case books for
international commercial arbitration, papers and books pre-
pared by arbitrators for conferences and other professional
gatherings provide a way for both traders and arbitrators to get
some insight for how similar conflicts in the future may be re-
solved. Furthermore, while the details of the outcome of an arbi-
tration may be unobserved, the fact that a contract ends up
being arbitrated in the first place is observable. That a particular
contractual form resulted in a dispute is itself useful information
for traders and arbitrators to take into account.
Second, traders and arbitrators have strong incentives to act
in a manner that resolves disputes in as low-cost a manner as
possible. As mentioned above, traders very frequently write arbi-
tration clauses into their contracts.69 If a conflict over contrac-
tual interpretation arises, traders want to resolve this conflict as
quickly and cheaply as possible; the more time and money tied
up in adjudication, the less time available for actually engaging
in profitable commerce.70 Adjudicators are also cost-conscious:
they must be voluntarily selected by all parties, since compulsory
jurisdiction does not exist. The selection of an adjudicator
would depend on traders’ perception of an adjudicator’s exper-
67 Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
68 Id. at 650.
69 See Leeson, supra note 33, at 64.
70 See Benson, supra note 22, 656–57.
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tise, as well as their reputation for impartiality (while selfish
traders may prefer an adjudicator biased in their favor, this is
highly unlikely to be agreed to by the other parties, since selec-
tion of an adjudicator must be voluntary and unanimous).71 Ad-
judicators who were perceived to be biased or inexpert would
find their reputations suffer, losing business as a result.72 And as
already mentioned, traders are very likely to agree voluntarily to
an adjudication decision, even if they believe it was decided in
error in their particular case. Traders who reneged would ac-
quire a reputation of being untrustworthy and would find it dif-
ficult to secure trading partners in the future.73 Except perhaps
in disputes involving extraordinarily large sums of money, with
one of the traders not anticipating being “in the game” for
much longer, defection from previously agreed upon arbitration
procedures is unlikely.
C. SOCIAL BENEFITS
The information-generating and incentive-aligning features of
a private legal commercial order are obviously beneficial for
traders and arbitrators, but they are also beneficial for the rest
of society as well. This is because economizing on costs—using
as few resources to achieve a goal as possible—leaves more re-
sources left over that can be put to other uses. When a firm cuts
costs, it makes higher profits, which benefits the firm. But in
lowering costs, it has also used up less resources, which can now
be used to satisfy other wants. This is good even for those who
do not work for the firm or do business with the firm. For exam-
ple, even those who do not ride trains prefer to live in a world
where railroad businesses use steel rails, rather than platinum or
titanium. These latter metals have much higher valued uses,
such as in communications satellites. In a world where railroads
are built using platinum or titanium, all society gets is expensive
rail travel. But in a world where railroads are built using steel,
and platinum and titanium are saved for making communica-
tions satellites, society gets cheap rails as well as telecommunica-
tion services. Society is wealthier by the amount of resources
saved by economizing on costs.
The information generated by a private commercial order
helps traders avoid conflict. Conflict is costly for traders; adjudi-
71 See id. at 649.
72 See id.
73 See Milgrom et al., supra note 28, at 9–10.
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cating conflict uses up real resources.74 Avoiding conflict in the
first place makes both traders and society as a whole wealthier.
But some amount of conflict due to honest disagreement over
contractual terms is unavoidable. In this situation, the incentives
of traders and arbitrators is to settle the dispute as quickly as
possible, subject to some decision procedure which is voluntarily
agreed upon, and thus decided by all parties to be beneficial ex
ante.75 Specific practices of merchant courts, such as simple rules
of evidence and forbidding appeals, result in minimal resources
devoted to conflict resolution, which again reflects the interests
of both traders and arbitrators, as well as society at large in the
form of economized costs.76
The incentives of traders and arbitrators are aligned through
reputational effects and the discipline of continuous dealings.
Traders bear the costs of arbitration and will only engage in ar-
bitration when they find such procedures to be mutually benefi-
cial. Arbitrators will preside over cases in exchange for
compensation, the future prospects of which incentivize them to
reach speedy and unbiased decisions. Because the costs of dis-
pute resolution are borne primarily by the parties to these dis-
putes, a private commercial legal order gives parties the
incentive to act in socially beneficial ways—or, to put it differ-
ently, the incentives within the system align what is personally
beneficial with what is socially beneficial.
Finally, it is worth contrasting this private legal commercial
order with the likely characteristics of a legal order that would
arise out of national or international governing bodies attempt-
ing to impose a set of rules.77 This would transform the legal
system from an order into an organization. Whereas a competi-
tive private legal order is capable of generating and conveying to
actors a greater amount of knowledge than any one of them can
acquire on their own, an organization cannot benefit from this
social intelligence mechanism.78 Rather than taking advantage
of the competitive discovery procedures embedded in a private
74 See HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 41–45, 50–55.
75 See Benson, supra note 22, at 649.
76 Id. at 650.
77 Neither a national nor an international governing body, in the abstract,
must be a bureaucratic or regulatory organization. But given the constraints
posed by the Outer Space Treaty, the most likely course of public action in the
pursuit of celestial governance would be this kind of organization or organiza-
tions. Of course, there is nothing precluding sovereigns from amending interna-
tional law to avoid this situation. See infra Part IV.
78 LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 48–56 (1944).
330 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
legal commercial order, the overseeing organization would, by
necessity, be taking a top-down approach.79 Bureaucrats and
regulators in this scenario would not be able to do as well in
implementing socially beneficial rules because there is no feed-
back mechanism informing them which rules best serve the in-
terests of commercial parties.80 Furthermore, bureaucrats and
regulators would face much weaker incentives to find effective
rules.81 Since they are making decisions the costs and benefits of
which primarily are borne by others, bureaucrats and regulators
would not personally confront costs and benefits in the same
way as under a private legal commercial order.82 In fact, the eco-
nomic literature on bureaucracy strongly suggests that bureau-
crats engage in cost-maximizing behavior, rather than cost-
minimizing behavior,83 because of a lack of competitive pressure
and personal cost bearing. Because of these incentive and infor-
mation problems, a private legal order for space commerce is
more consistent with desirable social consequences, such as cost-
minimization, than typical public organizational solutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The SPACE Act attempts to create an environment conducive
to space commerce by promoting U.S. citizens’ property rights
to celestial resources. This is controversial because it seems to
run afoul of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.84 The
problems posed by Article II can be overcome by a private law
regime for space commerce. A private law regime for space com-
merce is feasible: property claims to celestial resources, along
with rules for adjudicating conflicts over these claims, can be
self-enforcing. Thus, property rights and rules do not require
protection or enforcement by sovereign states. A private law re-
gime for space commerce is also desirable: as a spontaneous or-
der, it is stable enough to ground commercial actors’
expectations and flexible enough to meet the particulars of new
contractual arrangements. The legal regime renders the pursuit
of self-interest by commercial parties both information- and in-
centive-compatible with social wellbeing.
79 See id. at 48–53.
80 Id. at 40–56
81 See id. at 51–52.
82 See id. at 53–55.
83 See GORDON TULLOCK, BUREAUCRACY (1965), reprinted in 6 THE SELECTED
WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 210–23 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005).
84 See Tronchetti, supra note 7, at 8.
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There are several anticipated objections to this article. First, as
Tronchetti argues, both national and international law can be
modified to create a foundation for space commerce.85 This is
true; national and international efforts certainly should be made
to clarify certain points of international space law. However,
since significant amendment to the legal regime will have to
take place internationally in order to make clear the relation-
ship between territorial sovereignty and sovereign property
rights enforcement—or, in the extreme case, repealing Article
II—it must result from consensual agreement among sovereign
states. Securing this consent will likely be incredibly costly.
Given the feasibility and desirability of private commercial law in
space, a strong argument will have to be made for the superior-
ity of some form of public law in this case for the benefits of
international treaty amendment to be worth the costs.
Second, critics may charge that this approach is a de facto
concession of all authority by national space regulatory bodies.
This is not true. Instead, embracing a private commercial legal
order for space requires reorientation of these agencies. Existing
agencies can perform other roles that do not violate Article II.
For example, federal agencies can oversee launches by private
companies in the United States, to ensure safety standards are
met and that commercial space entities do not inadvertently
damage citizens’ lives or livelihoods. Agencies can also mitigate
the problem of space debris in desirable orbits, especially the
low earth orbits, by enforcing rules for deorbiting useless mate-
rial. In fact, many agencies are currently performing these or
similar roles, and there is nothing in my argument that compels
them to stop.86 The feasibility and desirability of private legal
commercial order in space still leaves ample room for national
agencies to keep space both safe and accessible for citizens, with-
out amounting to a de facto extension of territorial sovereignty,
as Tronchetti87 shows.
Third, critics might embrace a narrower definition of desira-
bility than currently discussed, one that a private legal commer-
cial order for space may not meet. While this objection is
obviously too broad to respond to sui generis, the one that merits
attention concerns wealth distribution. It may be conceded that
85 Id. at 7–8.
86 See, e.g., Brian Dunbar, NASA Invests in Private Sector Space Flight with
SpaceX, Rocketplane-Kistler (2006), https://www.nasa.gov/exploration/news/
COTS_selection.html [https://perma.cc/VJ53-T9BA].
87 See Tronchetti, supra note 7, at 9.
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a private legal commercial order for space is desirable in that it
would create massive amounts of new wealth. But the distribu-
tion of this wealth might be sufficiently objectionable that it out-
weighs the creation of the wealth itself. This claim is incredible,
but a satisfactory reply is to allow the private commercial order
in space, thereby allowing massive new wealth creation, and
then using domestic policy to affect a more desired distribution.
If a U.S. company creates wealth in space, the U.S. government
might not be able to enforce that company’s rights without vio-
lating Article II, but there is no reason why it cannot tax the
company’s earnings.88 These tax dollars can then be allocated
publicly in line with distributional goals. Ultimately, wealth must
be created before it can be distributed. Compared to the ex-
treme scenario of not allowing new wealth creation in the first
place, allowing the wealth creation and then redistributing some
of it makes many people better off, and nobody worse off.
We cannot know in advance how the existing body of private
commercial law will apply to space commerce. While we know
that some self-enforcing property and legal regime will emerge
out of contracting among commercial space entities, we cannot
say what the mixture of existing and new rules and institutions
will ultimately govern celestial commerce.89 This means scholar-
ship on space governance will be most useful if it answers which
space governance problems can be performed by national agen-
cies without violating international treaty, as well as which
problems, although they fall within the scope of a public
agency’s mandate, are best left to private initiative. The tools of
law and economics will be invaluable in understanding these
governance problems in theory and suggesting solutions to
them in practice. Importantly, we must avoid the “pretense of
knowledge”90 by not trying to write down a set of rules for space
governance that do not reflect, and cannot adapt to, the particu-
lar circumstances that commercial space entities will face.
88 The tax itself will prevent some potential wealth from being created. The
dissatisfaction due to the destroyed wealth must be compared to the satisfaction
due to achieving a more pleasing distribution of wealth to ascertain whether re-
distribution is worthwhile.
89 See Salter & Leeson, supra note 12, at 593.
90 Friedrich von Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge, Nobel Memorial Lecture
(Dec. 11, 1974), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/
laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html [https://perma.cc/P4ZQ-3YLU].
